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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
MICHAEL RAY EGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,
-vs-

Case No.

JOHN W. TURNER, \Varden, Utah
State Prison,

12707

Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
The Appellant, l\iichael Ray Egan, appeals from
a denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Following a plea of guilty and sentencing by the
trial court, Appellant sought a writ of habeas corpus
on grounds of denial of effective assistance of courtappointed counsel. The petition for writ of habeas
rorpus was denied.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Respondent submits that the decision of the
lower court should be affirmed.
STATE.MENT OF FACTS
On January 14, 1971, prior to trial on the charge
of an unlawful sale of a stimulant drug, Appellant.
with the assistance of court-appointed counsel, changed
his previously entered plea from not guilty to guilty.
Both Judge Bryant H. Croft and counsel for Appellant, Mrs. J\iargaret Taylor of the Salt Lake Legal De·
fender Association, were very careful to advise Appellant of his constitutional rights surrounding his change
of plea from not guilty to guilty. (Defendant's Exhibit
1-D, page 2-10). During these proceedings, Appellant
testified as follows (Defendant's Exhibit 1-D, p. 8):
Mrs. Taylor :-to that charge? You know that
the judge is the only person who can
grant you probation and that no one else
can make you any promises or have anything to do with that decision?
Mr. Egan:

Yes.

Mrs. Taylor: Has anyone made any promises to you or coerced you or pressured
you m any way - - Mr. Egan:

No.
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On February 16, 1971, Appellant was subsequently sentenced to prison following his plea of guilty. On
October 28, 1971, Appellant appeared in court on a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus contesting the competency of his court-appointed counsel before and during his plea of guilty and sentencing. Appellant was
represented by F. John Hill of the Salt Lake Legal
Defender Association in these proceedings. During the
proceedings, Appellant testified that prior to sentencing
he told his counsel, l\frs. Taylor, that he would like to
change his plea back to not guilty (R. 35). Mrs. Taylor also testified that she did not recall any specific
conversation at that time about changing Appellant's
plea back to not guilty ( R. 44) . After weighing the
evidence and making a finding of fact on the testimony
cited above, the trial court denied the writ of habeas
corpus.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT WAS NOT DENIED THE
EFFECTIVE AND Il\iPARTIAL ASSISTANCE OF COURT-APPOINTED COUNSEL
IN VIOLATION OF THE RIGHTS UNDER
THE SIXTH A l\i END 1\1 E N T OF THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
Appellant contends
sentenced, his counsel,

that after having been
Taylor, had a duty to pre-
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sent to the court his desire to change his plea from
guilty back to not guilty. Apparently, Appellant could
find no authority for this contention, for none is cited
in his brief. The authority in this area indicates that Mrs.
Taylor had no responsibility to try to withdraw Appellant's plea of guilty, and indeed would have found this
impossible without convincing proof of legal grounds
for so doing.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-24-3 ( 1953) states: "The
court may at any time before judgment, upon a plea of
guilty, permit it to be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty
substituted." After sentence has been imposed, the option
to change a plea of guilty changes.
In State v. Plum, 14 Utah 2d 124, 378 P.2d 671
( 1963) this Court considered whether or not a lower
court erred by refusing to permit the defendant to
change his plea after sentence has been pronounced. The
Court stated :
" (I) t is within the sound discretion of the
trial court to allow, or refuse to allow the plea
to be withdrawn . . . ( T) he sentence in a
criminal case is a final judgment, and one who
would set aside such a final order must proceed as the attacher and has the burden of
producing convincing proof of a fact which
constitutes legal ground for setting aside such
sentence. The presumption of validity is
strong." Id. at 125.
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Appellant testified that he pleaded guilty because
of a chance of probation, plus other charges being
dropped ( R. 35). After being sentenced and finding
that probation was denied, he then wanted to change
his plea back to not guilty. However, this reason alone
was not legal grounds to give his counsel, .Mrs. Taylor,
any chance of having the plea changed after sentencing
had occurred.
In State v. Plum, supra, the defendant pleaded
guilty to a felony and the prosecutor, following a "deal"
made with the defendant in order to induce him to make
the guilty plea, recommended probation to the trial
court. However, the trial court chose not to follow the
recommendation and sentenced defendant to a prison
term and refused to allow a change of plea after
sentence was pronounced. This Court held that such a
decision was within the sound discretion of the court,
and the decision was not disturbed on appeal when no
abuse was shown.
The Supreme Court of Nevada similarly ruled in
Bates v. State, 84 Nev. 43, 436 P.2d 27 (1968) saying
that it is clearly established that a belief or hope alone
that probation will be granted is insufficient to compel
a withdrawal of guilty plea where probation is denied.
See also, State v. Burnett, 228 Or. 556, 365 P.2d 1060
( HIGI); People v. Kelly, 184 Cal.App.2d 611, 7 Cal.
Rptr. 600 ( 1960); State v. Harris, 57 Wash.2d 383,
357 P.2d 719 ( 1960).
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In view of the above it is clear that Mrs. Taylor
was under no duty to bring to the court's attention Appellant's desire to change his plea back to not guilty
after the sentencing. At the trial, :Mr. Hill did not, as
Appellant contends, fail to inquire into l\lrs. Taylor's ,
failure to bring Appellant's desires to the court's at- ·
tention after the sentencing. l\ir. Hill did try to establish that l\Irs. Taylor failed to respond to Appellant's
desire to withdraw his guilty plea before sentencing
occurred. lVIrs. Taylor testified she did not recall any
specific conversation about changing the plea before
sentencing (R. 44). Mr. Hill called as witnesses both
Appellant and .:Mrs. Taylor and put before the court
their testimony. As the record clearly shows, Mr. Hill's
direct examination of Mrs. Taylor failed to disclose
any incompetency in her representation of Appellant.

1

Appellant also contends that a fair presentation
of his case was not possible since both court-appointed
attorneys were from the same Legal Defender Office.
Appellant does not cite any case or authority which is
comparable to the circumstances and facts surrounding
the instant case.
The mere possibility of a conflict of interest is not
enough to sustain such an assertion. In JYI anuel v. Salisbury, 446 F .2d 453 (6th Cir. 1971), the
considered
a charge of impermissible conflict of interest which allegedly deprived the defendant of effective assistance
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of counsel. The Court pointed out that evidence must
support such charges:

" ... the courts must indulge every reasonable
presumption that lawyers for criminal defendants will behave in a lawful, ethical manner
and in good faith. The A ppellee levels some
strong charges, and they must be supported by
evidence." Id. at 456.
In JVoods v. Beto, 324 F. Supp. 982 (N.D. Texas
1971) in a habeas corpus proceedings, the court also
required more than a mere allegation of conflict of interest. The court stated:
"In cases such as this where a potential conflict of interest is shown but where there is no
showing of harm, prejudice or injury to Petitioner's defense, other courts have denied
habeas corpus relief." Id. at 986.
Appellant in no way has shown how he was harmed
by the fact that both court-appointed attorneys were
from the same office. Absent a showing that appellant
was injured or that in any way he receiYed an unfair
trial because of his court-appointed counsel being from
the same office, the writ of habeas corpus should have
been denied.
Recently in Jaramillo v. Turner, 24 Utah 2d 19, 465
P .2d 343 ( 1970) this Court stated:
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"It is time to let imprisoned felons know that

even under the rules laid down by the Federal
Courts, freedom from confessed guilt, voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently admitted,
will not be given by the courts because of alleged incompetence of counsel unless there
has been such a flagrant abuse of legal procedure as to amount to bad faith on the part
of the lawyer." Id. at 22.

Appellant has failed to furnish evidence that would
support an allegation of bad faith on the part of either
attorney appointed to represent him in the proceedings
below.
POINT II
APPELLANT 'VAS NOT PROMISED
PROBATION IN EXCHANGE FOR A PLEA
OF GUILTY AND WAS NOT DENIED CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AFFORDED HIM
UNDER THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS.
Appellant correctly recognizes that whether or not
he was promised probation in exchange for his guilty
plea was a fact question on which the trial court entered
a finding.
As was quoted from Defendant's Exhibit 1-D.
page 8 in the S'l'ATE.MENT OF FACTS of this
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brief, appellant admitted in open court that he knew
the judge was the only person who could grant him
probation. He likewise testified that no one had coerced
him or made any promises to him or pressured him in
any way to enter a plea of guilty.
This Court has stated many times that habeas
corpus is not a substitute for and cannot properly be
treated as regular appellate review. Brown v. Turner,
21 Utah 2d 96, 440 P.2d 968 (1968). See also Scanllrett
v. Turner, .... Utah 2d.... , 489 P.2d 1186 (1971).
The position of this Court regarding a plea of
guilty following a plea bargaining situation has already
been presented in this brief in the case of State v. Plum,
supra. In that case the trial court denied probation to
defendant even after the prosecutor recommended probation to the court in exchange for the plea of guilty.
State v. Plu1n, supra, reaches much further than is
necessary to cover the instant case, for in the instant
case there was not even a recommendation from the
prosecution for probation.
CONCLUSION
The Respondent respectfully submits that the Appellant, :Michael Ray Egan, was not denied the effective and impartial assistance of court-appointed counsel and that his plea of guilty did not deny him constitu-
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tional rights. The denial of writ of habeas corpus should
be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General

DAVID S. YOUNG
Chief Assistant Attorney
General
Attorneys for Respondent

